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Abstract 
What type of crisis is generated when debt increases?  We study the Spanish debt evolution in 
the 19th and 20th centuries by introducing currency and stock-market crises in the Reinhart and 
Rogoﬀ (2011) framework. We find their same results for the determinants of banking and debt 
crises  but substituting external and public debt with perpetual debt. Moreover, we find that 
currency crises depend strongly and positively on financial centers crises and negatively and 
mildly on perpetual debt. We justify the negative relationship due to an inflation tax.  We also 
find that stock-market crises depend only positively and strongly on financial centers crises. 
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1. Introduction 
    What type of crisis is generated when a country decides to increase its debt, and in special, 
different types of debt (redeemable, perpetual, external, investment bonds...)? There is an 
important line of research studying the determinants of different types of crises, mainly in 
relation to the increase in debt (see for example Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)). Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2011, RR (2011) from now onwards), using a sample of 70 countries, conducted 
univariate and bivariate logit models to study the behavior of two dependent variables: banking 
crises and debt crises and they found that banking crises strongly depend on the financial center 
crisis and mildly on past banking crises and the amount of public (and external) debt. They also 
found that sovereign defaults (debt crisis) depend strongly on lags of banking crisis, past debt 
crises and some evidence of dependence of the amount of public debt. They used data spanning 
over two centuries but they did not include in the analysis other factors such as currency and 
stock market crises. More recently, we can find many papers studying the same issue, such as 
for example Amann and Middleditch (2015), showing that there is no support for the view that 
higher levels of debt cause reductions in economic activity. 
    Kaminsky et al. (1998) showed that it is possible to find a large number of explanatory 
variables that may signal the occurrence of a crisis. However, more recently, Candelon et al. 
(2010) and Candelon, Dumitrescu, Hurlin and Palm (2013) showed that univariate and 
multivariate dynamic probit models present the advantage of yielding plausible results while 
being fairly parsimoniously parametrized. They found relationships of three types of financial 
crisis (banking, currency and sovereign debt crisis), but they focused their analysis only from 
1985 onwards. This may have strong time limitations since the underlying cycle can be a half 
century or more long, not just 30 years (see RR (2011)). In our paper we want to extend the 
results of RR (2011) using a wider consideration of financial crises (including currency and 
stock market crises) and using data starting from 1850 onwards (improving therefore the results 
in Candelon, Dumitrescu, Hurlin and Palm (2013) to have a better knowledge of the underlying 
cycle by using two centuries of data). Moreover, in order to avoid the heterogeneity that can be 
observed when using panel databases of many countries, we will focus on a single country, such 
as Spain. We argue in Section 2 that financial crises have been more frequent in Spain than in 
the rest of the world from the 19th century; and from 1973 they have also been deeper and more 
complex. So Spain is a very interesting case for a deep study. 
    In more detail, our objective is to study the evolution of the Spanish debt in the 19th and 20th 
centuries and for that, we extend RR (2011) in two ways: first, we introduce as novelty in RR 
(2011) the concepts of stock market crisis and currency crisis in Spain. In Section 2.1, we 
explain the importance of the four type (banking, currency, debt and stock market) of crises in 
Spain and why we introduce them in the analysis. Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) constructed a 
composite index of banking, currency, debt, inflation crises, and stock market crashes (weighted 
by their share of world income) but in this paper we want to treat them separately to find out 
what type of crisis is generated by increases in debt. Second, we introduce in the analysis the 
concept of "perpetual debt" in Spain versus other types of debt such as external debt and public 
debt in RR (2011). In Section 2.2 we explain the role and the importance of perpetual debt in 
Spain. We analyze the impact of increasing different types of debt in Spain on different types of 
crises that this may generate. 
    The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we proceed to explain the idiosyncrasies and 
the specific characteristics of the Spanish debt in the 19th and 20th centuries, that forces us to 
extend the RR (2011) analysis by introducing the concepts of stock market and currency crises, 
the special role of the perpetual debt and the inflation tax structure. Section 3 contains the 
definition of the variables used in the analysis. Section 4 contains our main empirical results 
matching the existing economic history literature in Spain given in Section 2. Finally Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Idiosyncrasies of the Spanish financial system in the 19th and 20th 
centuries 
2.1 Considering a variety of crises in a context of higher frequency and 
severity of them in Spain 
    We proceed now to justify first, why we need to introduce in the empirical analysis of our 
paper the concepts of stock market and currency crises in the framework of RR (2011) when we 
want to study the Spanish case. There is a very extensive economic and financial literature 
studying the different types of crises all around the world. Kindleberger (2000) gave an 
extensive list of crises and financial shocks happening since the 17th century. Along the same 
lines Gooddhart and Delargy (1998) and Barro and Ursúa (2009) have given a detailed 
exposition of a series of stock market crises, considering their international role and their impact 
on economic depressions. Bordo (1986) and Eichengreen and Bordo (2003) have introduced in 
their analysis banking and currency crises and their general economic impact. Recently, the 
seminal work by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2010) provides a dataset of banking and financial 
crises around the world from 1800, focusing on the implications of the debt and banking crises, 
inflation and currency crises. This literature highlights the existence of a great variety of 
financial crises, that in some cases they do manifest as a combination of themselves. From a 
historical point of view, we can find that they happen in different circumstances, periods and 
countries; in some cases with a limited impact and in other cases at an international level. Bordo 
et al. (2001) have highlighted that it is necessary to distinguish between banking, currency and 
twin crises; and in this way, using a wide sample of countries, they show the importance of the 
different types of financial crises from a historical perspective. 
    In the Spanish case, Betrán, Martín-Aceña and Pons (2012) show that for a deep and accurate 
knowledge of the Spanish financial crises, we need to consider a wide variety of them. They 
show how these crises have been more frequent in Spain than in the rest of the world from the 
19th century, and from 1973 they have also been deeper and more complex. We can also 
observe this trend in the crisis starting on 2007. These authors offer us a framework from the 
economic history to develop our empirical analysis in Section 4: identifying and classifying for 
us the different types of crises and their categories, their frequency, duration and intensity. The 
number and severity of the financial crises experienced by Spain from 1850 to 19953, justifies 
our need to incorporate more types of crises (apart from debt and banking) to the RR (2011) 
analysis if we want to study the Spanish case. In short, RR (2011) used a sample of 70 countries 
to study general relationships of debt and banking crises on average for those countries; but if 
we want to carry out a deeper analysis, we can do so by reducing the number of countries 
                                                            
3Analyzed period by Betrán et al (2012). 
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They show that there are cases where, due to the government´s budget constraint of a country, 
we can find negative relationships between debt and currency crises. If the budgetary position of 
the government is strained, the government has several options, but one of them is that the 
government may create a monetary expansion (printing money) which induces inflation and it 
produces a currency crisis (therefore the government does not need to increase its debt). So if in 
the previous period the government has increased its perpetual debt, this may reduce the 
pressure of the government for the need of a monetary expansion and it is less likely the 
existence of a currency crisis. We proceed to show now how this budgetary situation exists in 
Spain in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
    The establishment of the Bank of Spain as the unique issuing bank of currency in 1874 had as 
a compensation, its commitment with the lending to the Treasure. The new monopoly given to a 
private bank was used by the Finance Ministers as a very attractive instrument, since they were 
able to finance their deficits by printing money, and therefore using the inflation tax that was 
reducing the real value of the debt and their interests (Comín 2012). The achievements of this 
type of policy was also supported by the huge fall in the external debt, until its practically non-
existence at the beginning of the 20th century, and the progressive impact of the interior debt 
(see figure 2). In short, the use of the indirect monetization of the budget deficit was 
consolidated through pledgeable debt. Banks were taking this type of debt that later was 
discounted in the Central Bank (Bank of Spain), and from 1913 private debt holders were 
incorporated into this mechanism (see Martín-Aceña (1985)). This became the main mechanism 
to finance budget deficits in Spain, and it avoided to have to turn to the traditional rescheduling 
as the unique way to overcome debt crises. 
    During Franco´s time, this instrument was applied until de Stabilitation Plan of 1959. Banks 
and savings banks were intensively regulated by the government (financial repression) in order 
to finance their economic growth policy, avoiding in this way increasing their public deficit. 
They policy was accompanied by the inflation tax. Both instruments made that depositors and 
holders of public debt were the main supporters of this financial policy, whose economic 
consequences were harmful for the savers5. 
    A very relevant consequence of these policies since the end of the 19th century was its impact 
on the monetary policy. Notes and current accounts in banks started to prevail over the metallic 
coin in the composition of money supply (see Martín Aceña and Pons, 2005). These changes 
happened in a context of monetary expansion facilitated through the above-mentioned policies 
that were allowing governments to reduce their liabilities through inflation. Escario, Sabaté and 
Gadea (2011) found a dynamic causal relationship of the budget balance with monetary growth 
since 1874 confirming this hypothesis. This relationship weakens from the 1990`s decade 
onwards as a result of the effort of nominal convergence that happened before the integration 
towards the euro. In short, the above-mentioned policies caused an increase in the monetary 
base and simultaneously, they generated inflation and monetary depreciation. These 
circumstances appear reflected in our empirical analysis in Section 4, where we find a negative 
estimated sign showing that an increase in the perpetual debt variable produces a smaller 
probability of currency crises in Spain. 
                                                            
5 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009): 76, 101 in relation to these type of policies at the international level. See also Juselius and Toro 
(2005) and Escario, Sabaté and Gadea (2011) for Spain. 
 
3. Definition of variables used in the empirical analysis 
    Betrán, Martín-Aceña and Pons (2012) has been our main source to obtain the dating of 
banking crises (see Betrán et al (2012), Table 1 in pages 422-423), currency crises (see Betrán et 
al (2012), Table 2 in page 426), stock market crises (see Betrán et al (2012), Table 5 in pages 
435-436) and crises of financial centers (see Betrán et al (2012), Table 5 in pages 435-436) in 
Spain from 1850 to 1995. That is the reason why we analyze the sample period 1850-1995, 
since this is the one used in Betrán, Martín-Aceña and Pons (2012) where they offer a very clear 
and homogeneous picture of the dating of the financial crises in Spain. Following Betrán, 
Martín-Aceña and Pons (2012), we removed the civil war years (1935-1939) from our analysis. 
In order to create our dummy variables, 1 is related to the existence of a crisis. We obtain the 
dating of the debt crises in Spain from the sovereign defaults stated in Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009) for this country6. 
    Data on different types of debt (redeemable, perpetual, external and the treasury) are obtained 
from Carreras and Tafunell (2005). We also use two types of aggregates of these types of debt 
in Appendix 1: (1) "State debt" that equals to the sum of redeemable debt, perpetual, external 
debt and investment bonds and (2) "public debt" that is the sum of state debt, treasury debt, 
special domestic debt, credits from abroad (guaranteed by the State) and Bank of Spain debt 
(see also Figure 2). Following RR (2011) we computed ratios of the different types of debt 
versus the GDP as regressors (see our Appendices 1 and 2). All types of debt and the GDP are 
measured in millions of pesetas in our analysis. 
    RR (2011) used univariate and bivariate-logit models while Candelon et al. (2010) and 
Candelon et al (2013) focused their results on multivariate probit models. We show in Section 4 
that our results are robust to using logit and probit models and of different dimensions 
(univariate and multivariate models). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Univariate models 
    Following RR (2011, below their Figures 3, 4, 9 and 14), we start with a univariate analysis 
with regressions of our four types of crises using different independent variables one by one of 
the different types of lagged ratios of debt described in Section 3 in relation to the GDP. Results 
are given in Appendix 17 where we have estimated all models by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
and using logit models with robust standard errors (as in RR (2011)). We show in bold the 
statistical significant relationships with probability values (p-values) less than 0.1 in all Tables. 
We have kept a constant estimated in all models. If we run the same regressions using probit 
models, all results from logit models are confirmed. 
    We found in Appendix 1 (see Table 3) that the only ratio with one lag that affects both 
banking and debt crises is perpetual debt/GDP (in our Tables, we name it "Perpetual 
                                                            
6 See also Comin (2012) and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereign_default where the sovereign defaults in Spain are during the 
years 1809, 1820, 1831, 1834, 1851, 1867, 1872, 1882, 1936--1939. 
7 All univariate models have been estimated and tested in STATA (2013). 
Debt/GDP(t-1)"). That ratio affects strongly at banking crises (both estimated with OLS and 
with logit models) and mildly to debt crises (we only find a strong relationship with the logit 
model with a p-value of 0.019 and a p-value of 0.123 with OLS). All the rest of the debt ratios 
in Appendix 1 (including ratios where we sum perpetual debt and treasure bonds and perpetual 
with redeemable debt) do not appear to be statistically significant to explain the different types 
of crises. Only the ratio of perpetual and redeemable debt seems to have a mild relationship with 
a p-value of 0.086 with banking crises, but still, this relationship is less strong than with the 
ratio of perpetual debt. That is why we choose the ratio of "Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1)" as the 
representative ratio of debt in Spain in section 4.2. We have tried different lags of debt ratios 
apart from the first one, but they were not statistically significant. 
    Note that we find a mild relationship of currency crises with the perpetual debt ratio that is 
negative (with a p-value of 0.175 and 0.257 for the OLS and the logit model in Table 3) that 
will be important to explain later the results from the multivariate section that follows. This type 
of negative relationship has already been documented in Section 2.3. 
 
4.2 Multivariate models 
    Following RR (2011, Tables 1-3) we proceed to a multivariate analysis. RR (2011) only 
showed the results of a bivariate logit model (since they only focused on two types -banking and 
debt- of crises). We start with a multivariate probit model with 4 dependent variables (currency, 
debt, banking and stock market crises). Later in order to show the robustness of our results, we 
will show that our conclusions are robust to using as well tri-variate probit models and also bi-
variate logit (as RR (2011)) and bivariate probit models8. Given that our sample size is not very 
large, our strategy is not to choose a unique model but to check the robustness of our results by 
estimating multiple multivariate and univariate probit and logit models (this is a very common 
strategy in practice such as in RR (2011) with bivariate logit models). 
    Results are given in Appendix 2. We show in bold the statistical significant relationships with 
a p-value less than 0.1. Since we cannot introduce more than one variable related to debt 
(among those of Appendix 1) at the same time as an independent regressor in order to avoid 
multicollinearity, we chose to introduce the ratio "Interior Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1)" in the 
multivariate analysis since we found in Appendix 1 that this is the ratio that affects both 
banking and debt crises. 
    We start estimating a multivariate probit model with 4 dependent variables (currency, debt, 
banking and stock market crises) in Table 6, and in the spirit of RR (2011), we introduce as 
independent variables the first lag of the ratio of perpetual debt/GDP, the first lag of banking 
crises and crises in financial centers (we introduced more lags and combinations of them as in 
RR (2011) but they were no statistically significant). We see how we can only find a very strong 
statistical significant relationship between crises in financial centers with banking, currency and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
8 Recent developments of econometric packages such as the estimation of bivariate Logit models with the R program ZeligChoice 
by Lau, Imai, and King (2015) and multivariate Probit models estimated by maximum likelihood with the R program mvProbit of 
Henningsen (2015) have allowed us to carry out our empirical results. Bivariate probit models have also been estimated and tested 
in STATA (2013). 
 
stock market crises with the expected positive estimated signs. In RR (2011) this happened only 
with banking crises in their Tables 1-3 (since they did not consider the other two types of 
crises). Since a four-dimensional probit model has many parameters to estimate and our sample 
size is not very large, we proceed the analysis estimating tri-variate and bi-variate probit models 
to check that our conclusions are robust. 
    We proceed estimating the four possible tri-variate probit models we can have with our four 
dependent variables. Results are given in Tables 7-10. These results confirm the results of Table 
6 and also the univariate results from Appendix 1. 
    We proceed now to estimate the six possible bi-variate probit models that we can construct 
with our four dependent variables to check the robustness of our conclusions. Results are given 
in Tables 11-16 and again, these results confirm those of Table 6 and also the univariate results 
from Appendix 1. In special, our Table 11 coincides with the two dependent variables logit 
model analyzed in RR (2011). Moreover, we show that our results are also robust if we use 
estimated bi-variate probit or bi-variate logit models. Note that in Tables 11-16 there are some 
variables that are only mildly statistically significant in the results (for example the ratio 
"Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1)" as determinant of debt crisis in Tables 11 and 15), but we keep those 
variables in the model because the estimated value of the log-likelihood function decreases if we 
remove it (also note how RR (2011, see Tables 1-3) also have kept some independent variables 
in their chosen bivariate logit model that were not statistically significant). 
    Our main conclusions are as follows: 
1. Banking crises depend (1) strongly on lags of the ratio of perpetual debt versus the GDP 
(see our Tables 10, 11 and 12) and (2) strongly on crises in financial centers (see Tables 
6-16). We obtain the same estimated expected positive signs as in RR (2011) for both 
variables. 
2. Debt crises depend (1) strongly on lags of banking crises (see Tables 11, 15 and 16), 
and (2) mildly on lags of the ratio of perpetual debt versus the GDP (see only Table 16. 
In Tables 11 and 15 we find only a mild relationship). We obtain again the same 
estimated positive expected signs as in RR (2011). 
3. Currency crises depend (1) strongly on crises in financial centers (see Tables 6-16) and 
(2) mildly on lags of the ratio of perpetual debt versus the GDP (see only Table 14. In 
Tables 12 and 15 we can only find a p-value around 0.14). We obtain the estimated and 
expected positive sign for crises in financial centers but in relation to the second 
variable, we find that a decrease in perpetual interior debt accompanies currency crises 
in Spain. This empirical finding is justified from the historical point of view in Section 
2.3. 
4. Stock market crises depend only strongly and positively on crises in financial centers 
(see Tables 6-16). 
5. Note also that crises in financial centers always present the largest estimated value as 
determinant of banking, currency and stock market crises (see Tables 6-15). Therefore, 
we find that this is the main factor to explain the different types of crises in Spain. 
    Our conclusions in relation to the determinants of banking and debt crises confirm the results 
of RR (2011) introducing the role of the perpetual debt in the analysis. Our results extend those 
of RR (2011) by finding also determinants of currency and stock market crises. 
 
5. Conclusions 
    We study the evolution of the Spanish debt in the 19th and 20th centuries and for that, we 
extend RR (2011) in two ways: first, we introduce as novelty in RR (2011) the concepts of stock 
market and currency crises in Spain. Second, we introduce in the analysis the concept of 
perpetual debt in Spain versus external debt and public debt in RR (2011). We find that the 
results of RR (2011) remain the same for the determinants of banking and debt crises but where 
we need to replace lags of external debt and public debt with lags of interior perpetual debt in 
order to get statistical significant relationships. Moreover, we find determinants of currency and 
stock market crises as follows: (1) Currency crises depend strongly on crisis in financial centers 
and mildly on lags of interior perpetual debt. We find the estimated expected positive sign for 
crises in financial centers. But in relation to the second variable, we find that a decrease in 
perpetual interior debt accompany currency crises in Spain. This empirical finding is justified in 
Section 2.3 from the historical point of view. (2) Stock market crises depend only positively and 
strongly on the crisis in financial centers. 
    In short, what is our main contribution to the open debate initiated by the seminal work of 
RR? In our analysis, we have stayed outside the implications between debt and economic 
growth, probably the most polemic aspect of their argument. We have decided to treat an issue 
that it is not pheripheral at all and that it is in the center of the debate: to offer a deeper study of 
the causality relationships between different types of crises and the role of different types of 
debts in this context. Our results confirm the conclusions of RR (2011) for banking and debt 
crises even when we introduce a wider variety of types of debt and types of crises in the 
analysis. However, referring to the idea given by Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martínez-
Peria (2001) "History thus confirms that there is something different and disturbing about our 
age", and as a result of what we find in our paper, we can highlight two issues: 
    (1) Idiosyncrasies of national economies are a very important determinant of the morphology 
of the crises (different types of debt, different ways of instrumenting monetary policies, 
regulation and inflation tax) and the way that each economy interacts with the exterior crises 
(crises in financial centers). 
    (2) The analysis should be multivariate and quite complex if we want to get deeper in the 
issue (since debt crises are not required to have a central role and countries can experience much 
more types of different crises). Once we proceed in our analysis looking for causal relationships, 
we find that the debt role is relativized. Studying the case of Spain, we find that monetary 
policies, financial repression and the inflation tax have a crucial role as mechanisms to hide the 
budget deficit and the debt burden; aspects that are also treated in the RR framework. 
    We believe that it is important simultaneously not only to study data coming from panels of 
many (heterogenous) countries, but also to analyze individual countries allowing for deeper 
studies and with a larger number of variables that can be based on the particularities of each 
country. We may also analyze panels with smaller groups of countries that can share similar 
characteristics (and therefore, less aggregated panels). This may be the object of future research. 
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Appendix 1: Tables. Univariate Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Regressions of the four types of crises using different independent variables one by one. Sample: 1850-1995.
Independent variables State Debt/GDP(t-1) Public Debt/GDP(t-1)
Dependent variable OLS (robust errors) Logit (robust errors) OLS (robust errors) Logit (robust errors)
Banking Crisis 0.074 0.964 0.051 0.671
p-value 0.220 0.174 0.413 0.374
R2 0.012 0.020 0.006 0.010
Currency Crisis -0.061 -1.156 -0.033 -0.586
p-value 0.301 0.349 0.587 0.606
R2 0.009 0.022 0.003 0.006
Debt Crisis 0.085 2.799 0.074 2.274
p-value 0.070 0.001 0.101 0.006
R2 0.040 0.140 0.030 0.101
Stock Market Crisis 0.037 0.422 0.024 0.279
p-value 0.561 0.544 0.692 0.681
R2 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002
Table 2: Regressions of the four types of crises using different independent variables one by one. Sample: 1850-1995.
Independent variables Public Debt/(GDPper capita)(t-1) Redeemable Debt/GDP(t-1)
Dependent variable OLS (robust errors) Logit (robust errors) OLS (robust errors) Logit (robust errors)
Banking Crisis 1.50e-09 2.06e-08 -0.034 -0.477
p-value 0.710 0.704 0.900 0.901
R2 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
Currency Crisis 1.53e-09 2.52e-08 0.138 2.169
p-value 0.717 0.710 0.660 0.638
R2 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004
Debt Crisis 2.46e-09 8.59e-08 0.052 1.772
p-value 0.310 0.237 0.746 0.729
R2 0.008 0.029 0.001 0.003
Stock Market Crisis 9.62e-09 1.14e-08 0.044 0.515
p-value 0.797 0.795 0.879 0.877
R2 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Regressions of the fourtypes of crises using different independent variables one by one. Sample: 1850-1995.
Independent variables Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1) External Debt/GDP(t-1)
Dependent variable OLS (robust errors) Logit (robust errors) OLS (robust errors) Logit (robust errors)
Banking Crisis 0.139 1.767 0.081 1.039
p-value 0.094 0.047 0.632 0.602
R2 0.0019 0.033 0.002 0.004
Currency Crisis -0.108 -2.251 -0.116 -2.409
p-value 0.175 0.257 0.412 0.506
R2 0.014 0.034 0.005 0.013
Debt Crisis 0.088 2.815 0.273 7.227
p-value 0.123 0.019 0.065 0.001
R2 0.020 0.070 0.065 0.191
Stock Market Crisis 0.053 0.606 0.083 0.929
p-value 0.564 0.544 0.637 0.611
R2 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003
Table 4: Regressions of the three types of crises using different independent variables one by one. Sample: 1850-1995.
Independent variables Treasury Debt/GDP(t-1) (PerpetualTreassure) Debt/GDP(t-1)
Dependent variable OLS (robust errors) Logit (robust errors) OLS (robust errors) Logit (robust errors)
Banking Crisis -0.245 -4.069 0.095 1.212
p-value 0.156 0.205 0.208 0.154
R2 0.007 0.014 0.011 0.018
Currency Crisis 0.422 5.875 -0.051 -0.942
p-value 0.194 0.118 0.488 0.520
R2 0.0024 0.044 0.004 0.008
Debt Crisis -0.108 -4.974 0.065 2.055
p-value 0.291 0.348 0.198 0.079
R2 0.003 0.015 0.013 0.045
Stock Market Crisis -0.175 -2.297 0.028 0.327
p-value 0.463 0.500 0.718 0.709
R2 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001
 Appendix 2: Tables. Multivariate Analysis 
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Table 5: Regressions of the three types of crises using different independent variables one by one. Sample: 1850-1995.
Independent variables (PerpetualRedeemable) Debt/GDP(t-1)
Dependent variable OLS (robust errors) Logit (robust errors)
Banking Crisis 0.121 1.654
p-value 0.117 0.086
R2 0.016 0.029
Currency Crisis -0.084 -1.504
p-value 0.271 0.285
R2 0.010 0.021
Debt Crisis 0.083 3.036
p-value 0.084 0.003
R2 0.020 0.077
Stock Market Crisis 0.050 0.596
p-value 0.539 0.529
R2 0.003 0.004
Table 6: Multivariate probit with 4 dependent variables. P-values are given in parenthesis. Sample: 1850-1995.
Dependent variables
Independent variables Banking Crisis Currency Crisis Stock Market Crisis Debt Crisis
Intercept -2.112 (0.000) -1.728 (0.008) -1.847 (0.000) -3.646 (0.582)
Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1) 1.062 (0.219) -1.115 (0.775) 0.452 (0.682) 2.296 (0.817)
First lag of Banking crisis 0.525 (0.673) -0.445 (0.988) 0.337 (0.937) 1.556 (0.534)
Financial Center Crisis 1.472 (0.025) 2.103 (0.006) 1.866 (0.011) 0.802 (0.977)
Table 7: Trivariate probit. P-values are given in parenthesis. Sample: 1850-1995.
Dependent variables
Independent variables Banking Crisis Currency Crisis Stock Market Crisis
Intercept -2.115 (0.000) -2.085 (0.000) -1.954 (0.000)
Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1) 1.108 (0.138) 0.008 (0.996) 0.795 (0.330)
First lag of Banking crisis 0.524 (0.340) -1.002 (0.400) 0.314 (0.798)
Financial Center Crisis 1.370 (0.007) 2.346 (0.000) 1.916 (0.000)
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Trivariate probit. P-values are given in parenthesis. Sample: 1850-1995.
Dependent variables
Independent variables Banking Crisis Currency Crisis Debt Crisis
Intercept -2.109 (0.000) -1.711 (0.000) -3.462 (0.580)
Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1) 1.032 (0.185) -1.157 (0.607) 2.036 (0.828)
First lag of Banking crisis 0.471 (0.448) -0.473 (0.958) 1.496 (0.549)
Financial Center Crisis 1.471 (0.007) 2.087 (0.000) 0.750 (0.941)
Table 9: Trivariate probit. P-values are given in parenthesis. Sample: 1850-1995.
Dependent variables
Independent variables Banking Crisis Stock Market Crisis Debt Crisis
Intercept -2.111 (0.000) -1.848 (0.000) -3.803 (0.430)
Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1) 1.053 (0.189) 0.441 (0.543) 2.530 (0.744)
First lag of Banking crisis 0.509 (0.526) 0.392 (0.824) 1.589 (0.442)
Financial Center Crisis 1.472 (0.010) 1.871 (0.001) 0.628 (0.940)
Table 10: Trivariate probit. P-values are given in parenthesis. Sample: 1850-1995.
Dependent variables
Independent variables Currency Crisis Stock Market Crisis Debt Crisis
Intercept -1.718 (0.001) -1.845 (0.000) -3.515 (0.646)
Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1) -1.142 (0.610) 0.421 (0.615) 2.095 (0.843)
First lag of Banking crisis -0.411 (0.924) 0.177 (0.944) 1.523 (0.702)
Financial Center Crisis 2.095 (0.001) 1.864 (0.004) 0.682 (0.963)
Two dependent variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Bivariate probit and logit. P-values are given in parenthesis. Sample: 1850-1995.
Logit model Probit model
Dependent variables Dependent variables
Independent variables Banking Crisis Debt Crisis Banking Crisis Debt Crisis
Intercept -4.021 (0.024) -8.650 (0.022) -2.091 (0.000) -3.723 (0.002)
Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1) 2.571 (0.294) 6.765 (0.137) 1.156 (0.064) 2.540 (0.114)
First lag of Banking crisis - 4.455 (0.022) - 1.750 (0.018)
Financial Center Crisis 3.017 (0.007) - 1.571 (0.000) -
Table 12: Bivariate probit and logit. P-values are given in parenthesis. Sample: 1850-1995.
Logit model Probit model
Dependent variables Dependent variables
Independent variables Banking Crisis Currency Crisis Banking Crisis Currency Crisis
Intercept -3.993 (0.024) -3.084 (0.000) -2.087 (0.000) -1.707 (0.000)
Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1) 2.534 (0.048) -3.160 (0.141) 1.149 (0.066) -1.258 (0.199)
First lag of Banking crisis - - - -
Financial Center Crisis 2.998 (0.000) 3.883 (0.000) 1.564 (0.000) 2.041 (0.000)
Table 13: Bivariate probit and logit. P-values are given in parenthesis. Sample: 1850-1995.
Logit model Probit model
Dependent variables Dependent variables
Independent variables Banking Crisis Stock Market Crisis Banking Crisis Stock Market Crisis
Intercept -3.943 (0.000) -3.013 (0.000) -2.079 (0.000) -1.674 (0.000)
Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1) 2.422 (0.057) - 1.135 (0.068) -
First lag of Banking crisis - - - -
Financial Center Crisis 2.965 (0.000) 3.347 (0.000) 1.562 (0.000) 1.886 (0.000)
  
Table 14: Bivariate probit and logit. P-values are given in parenthesis. Sample: 1850-1995.
Logit model Probit model
Dependent variables Dependent variables
Independent variables Currency Crisis Stock Market Crisis Currency Crisis Stock Market Crisis
Intercept -2.902 (0.000) -3.020 (0.000) -1.645 (0.000) -1.681 (0.000)
Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1) -4.378 (0.054) - -1.549 (0.120) -
First lag of Banking crisis - - - -
Financial Center Crisis 4.035 (0.000) 3.356 (0.000) 2.058 (0.000) 1.892 (0.000)
Table 15: Bivariate probit and logit. P-values are given in parenthesis. Sample: 1850-1995.
Logit model Probit model
Dependent variables Dependent variables
Independent variables Currency Crisis Debt Crisis Currency Crisis Debt Crisis
Intercept -3.084 (0.000) -6.923 (0.002) -1.667 (0.000) -3.444 (0.000)
Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1) -3.077 (0.140) 4.413 (0.142) -1.415 (0.150) 2.141 (0.117)
First lag of Banking crisis - 3.427 (0.013) - 1.610 (0.013)
Financial Center Crisis 3.883 (0.000) - 2.030 (0.000) -
Table 16: Bivariate probit and logit. P-values are given in parenthesis. Sample: 1850-1995.
Logit model Probit model
Dependent variables Dependent variables
Independent variables Stock Market Crisis Debt Crisis Stock Market Crisis Debt Crisis
Intercept -3.017 (0.000) -8.787 (0.006) -1.680 (0.000) -2.678 (0.000)
Perpetual Debt/GDP(t-1) - 7.049 (0.074) - 1.341 (0.167)
First lag of Banking crisis - 4.547 (0.007) - 1.214 (0.028)
Financial Center Crisis 3.408 (0.000) - 1.893 (0.000) -
